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Abstract:  Mobile agents are software entities that can migrate autonomously throughout a network 
from host to host. This means they are not bounded to the platform they begin execution. This feature 
of agents makes them a very attractive technology, and in fact it has been argued many times in the 
literature that mobile agents help to reduce network traffic and perform tasks more efficient. 
However, security issues have not yet been fully investigated and in fact, mobile agent platforms 
sometimes they neglect the security issues involved with agent mobility.  This paper presents a 
security related evaluation of 8 main mobile agent platforms. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Developing complex computerised systems 
has proved to be a difficult task. Actually, it 
has been argued that developing software 
for domains like telecommunications 
represents one of the most complex tasks 
humans undertake.  
Agent technology introduces an alternative 
approach in developing complex 
computerised systems. According to this, a 
complex computerised system is viewed as a 
multi-agent system in which autonomous 
software agents (subsystems) interact with 
each other in order to satisfy their design 
objectives. Such approach provides 
designers with more flexibility in their 
development. The actual design of the 
system takes place by specifying a multi-
agent system as a society, similar to a 
human society, consisting of entities that 
possess characteristics similar to humans 
such as mobility, and intelligence with the 
capability of communicating. 
The concept of a software agent, however, is 
not uniquely defined. Researchers have 
given definitions of the concept according to 
some typical characteristics, some 
operational characteristics or some cognitive 
functions that agents should implement.   
One of the most promising features of 
software agents is mobility. Mobile agents 
are software entities that can migrate 
autonomously throughout a network from 
host to host. This means they are not 
bounded to the platform they begin 
execution. However, this feature of agents 
although makes them a very attractive 
technology, it also makes the development 
of platforms (known also as frameworks and 
environments) that will support mobile 
agent systems very challenging. One of the 
main challenges is to develop platforms 
which will allow a secure migration of 
mobile agents. Many issues are involved, 
with respect to security, such as securing the 
mobile agent from a malicious platform, 
security the platform from malicious agents 
and so on.  
Although, many different platforms have 
been proposed by researchers, we believe 
that security, unlike some other non 
functional requirements such as 
performance, has not really thought of 
during the development of these platforms.  
This paper indicates the results of an 
evaluation, with respect to security, of 8 
major agent platforms. Our findings justify 
the above claim regarding the lack of 
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adequate security mechanisms of these 
platforms. Section 2 presents a brief 
introduction to mobile agent migration, 
whereas Section 3 discusses the security 
implication of mobile agent systems. 
Section 4 discusses the evaluation and 
section 5 concludes the paper and presents 
ideas for future work.  
 
2. Mobile Agent Migration 
 
A mobile agent is made up of code and state 
information, which is needed to perform 
some form of computation (Jansen and 
Karrygianis, 1999). Therefore, for a mobile 
agent to execute, an agent platform is 
required, which is made up of the 
computational environment. 
A mobile agent is characterized by its ability 
to migrate, during execution, from one host 
to another as well as between different 
platforms; even these are running in the 
same host (see Figure 1 for a partial 
graphical representation).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A mobile agent system (Jansen 
and Karrygianis, 1999) 
A mobile agent either performs a hop or a 
multi-hop. A hop is defined as the 
movement of an agent from its home 
platform to another platform. Similarly, a 
mobile agent is said to multi-hop when it 
hops through various platforms. 
 
3. Security Implications in Mobile 
Agent Systems 
 
Security threats in mobile agent systems can 
be categorised into four main categories 
(Jansen and Karrygianis, 1999): (a) Agent to 
agent attack, when a malicious agent attacks 
another agent; (b) Agent to platform, when 
an agent attacks a platform; (c) Platform to 
an agent, when a platform launches an 
attack on an agent; (d) External to an agent, 
when other (non agent) entities attack an 
agent. 
 
3.1 Agent to agent 
 
This is usually in the form of (i) 
masquerade, in which one agent assumes 
the identity of another to deceive an 
unsuspecting agent and gain access to 
sensitive information; (ii) denial of services 
to another agent, which is usually in the 
form of spam messages sent repeatedly to an 
agent in order to consume its resources; (iii) 
unauthorized access, where an agent 
interferes directly with another agent by the 
invocation of its public methods if the 
agent’s home platform has no control 
mechanism in place; (iv) repudiation, which 
occurs when an agent denies participation 
on a transaction; (v) eavesdropping, where 
an agent can gain access to information 
about other agents’ activities, by using 
services provided by the platform. 
 
3.2 Agent to Platform 
 
This is usually in the form of (i) masquerade 
where an agent tries to gain access on a 
platform by assuming the identity of another 
agent; (ii) Denial of Service, in which an 
agent disallows access to services on the 
agent’s platform;(iii) unauthorized access, in 
which an agent gains unauthorised access to 
Home 
platform Agent Agent 
platfor
m 
Network 
Agent
Platform 
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a platform and is capable of causing harm to 
that platform. 
3.3 Platform to an agent 
 
This is usually in the following forms: (i) 
masquerade, where a platform can assume 
the identity of another platform in an 
attempt to deceive another agent with 
regards to an intended destination as well as 
its security policy; (ii) denial of service, 
where a platform ignores service request or 
may terminate request without notification; 
(iii) eavesdropping,  when confidential and 
sensitive information is monitored and 
interpreted by agent platform; (iv) alteration, 
when an agent arrives at the platform and 
exposes its code, state and data to the 
platform. A malicious platform will attempt 
to modify the code, state and data of the 
visiting agent unknowingly to the agent. 
This alters the integrity of the agent.  
 
3.4 Other to agent 
 
This occurs in the following ways: (i) 
masquerade, where an agent makes a request 
from a platform either remotely or locally. 
An agent or a remote platform can assume 
the identity of another to get unauthorized 
access to resources to which it is not entitled 
to; (ii) denial of Service, where an entity can 
access agent platforms server either 
remotely or locally where an agent with 
malicious intent can interfere with services 
that are offered by the platform and inter-
platform communication; (iii) unauthorised 
access ;  If remote access to the platform is 
not properly secured or protected, entities 
can get access easily and free through  
scripts available on the internet that can be 
used to subvert  operating system in order to 
gain control of all systems resources; (iv) 
Copy and replay; when a mobile agent 
migrate from one host to the other, it 
exposes itself to security threat, the message 
it is migrating with can be intercepted and 
replay or clone for retransmission [8].  
 
Figure 2 provides a summary of threat per 
each category.  
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Figure 2. Threats per category 
 
3.5 Security requirements 
In general, mobile agent systems have the 
same requirements as general computer 
systems. These requirements as suggested in 
(Jansen and Karrygianis, 1999) are: 
1. Confidentiality;   any data that is 
stored privately on a platform or carried by 
an agent should remain confidential. Intra 
platform and inter platform communication 
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must also remain confidential and must be 
ensured by agent framework,  
2. Integrity; ensuring that there is no 
unauthorized modification of the agent 
framework.  
3. Availability; Data and services to 
both local and remote agents must be made 
available by the agent platform. Data that is 
shared must be available in a form that can 
be used as well as capacity to handle 
availability of large volumes of request by 
visiting platform and remote agent. 
4. Anonymity; that there should be a 
balance between the needs of an agent for 
privacy with the needs of an agent for 
platform to hold an agent accountable for 
their actions. 
5. Accountability; .all actions must be 
accountable for by the agent i.e. all 
processes, operations, meetings of an agent 
on any given platform. Accountability is 
necessary for building trust among agent 
platforms and agent. Audit logs are 
invaluable source for platform recovery of 
security breach.  
 
4. Platform Evaluation 
 
Literature provides a wide range of available 
agent platforms (Melomey, 2005). For the 
purpose of our evaluation we have identified 
some of these platforms, which we think are 
the most appropriate for our research. The 
selection was based on the following 
criteria:  
• It supports mobility. A basic 
requirement for any mobile agent 
infrastructure is its ability to migrate 
autonomously from one computer or host 
computer to the other. First, agent should be 
able to migrate with its entire codes as it 
goes along and be able to run on any server. 
Secondly, some servers only require a pre 
installation of agents’ code; such servers do 
not need transfer of codes to resume 
execution. Lastly, with some servers, no 
code is carried by the agent but rather 
contains a reference to its code base. 
• It should be free to use and active. 
All platforms chosen for this evaluation are 
available for free download. Moreover, the 
project is still active meaning the platform is 
supported either by the developers or from a 
user group.  
• It is written in a language that is 
widely known with preference to java and 
scripting language. All the platforms for this 
evaluation are written in java except for 
Telescript which uses the scripting language 
but it compatible with java platforms and 
also widely known.  
Following the above criteria, we have 
identified the following platforms for our 
evaluation: Ajanta, Aglet, Voyager 
Concordia, Telescript , Agent Tcl, Tacoma , 
and JADE 
 
4.1 Criteria for assessment 
Criteria for performing evaluation of the 
selected platforms have been developed 
based on the security countermeasures and 
requirement of mobile agent platforms. In 
total, forty-one criteria were identified. 
However, due to lack of space we focus on 
six of them1.  
Criterion 1: Audit Log for the platform 
should trace agent falsely repudiating an 
action.  
Criterion 2: Safe code interpreter should 
evaluate all codes.  
Criterion 3: Agents should be held 
accountable for their action by using audit 
trails 
Criterion 4: The agents function should be 
encrypted. 
Criterion 5: support of fault tolerance 
mechanisms. 
                                                 
1 Please refer to (Melomey,2005) for the complete list of 
criteria 
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Criterion 6: Support for authentication and 
access lists when authorised agents join a 
transaction 
  
The following table indicates the evaluation 
of the platforms with relation to the above 
criteria.  
 
1 2 3 4 
NOT 
SUPPORTED 
POORLY 
SUPPORTED 
ADEQUATELY 
SUPPORTED 
FULLY 
SUPPORTED 
 
PLATFORMS CRITERION 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Criterion 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Criterion 2  4 4 1 1 1 1 1 4 
Criterion 3 3 1 3 3 1 3 3 3 
Criterion 4 4 4 1 2 4 1 1 2 
Criterion 5 4 1 4 4 1 4 1 4 
Criterion 6 3 1 3 4 4 1 3 4 
 
Key 
Platform 1 AJANTA, Platform 2 AGENT TCL  
Platform 3 VOYAGER, Platform 4 
CONCORDIA   
Platform 5 TELESCRIPT, Platform 6 
TACOMA  
Platform 7 AGLETS, Platform 8 JADE 
 
Table 1. The evaluation Table 
 
4.2 Discussion about the evaluation 
 
Criterion 1: All platforms except Agent Tcl 
and Telescript provide adequate support. 
JADE provides full support, mainly because 
it is based on FIPA specification. Under 
FIPA 98 specification, an automated 
mechanism is used to record platform 
activities in an audit log which is protected. 
This takes place in order to maintain 
accountability at platform level, especially 
with regards to repudiation.  
Criterion 2: Fully supported by Ajanta, 
Agent Tcl and JADE. Ajanta provides (or 
loads) code on demand from a specified 
agent server. Moreover, agents execute a 
protected domain that is isolated, in order to 
prevent agent interference. The function of 
the safe code interpreter is to execute 
commands requiring access to system 
resources. JADE, Aglet, Voyager and 
Concordia use byte code for verification 
(Kadhi and Boury, 2001), whereas Agent Tcl 
uses safe code and Tacoma uses firewalls. 
Criterion 3: Adequately supported by 
Ajanta, Voyager, Concordia, Tacoma, Aglet 
and JADE. Ajanta’s full support is based on 
the fact that the audit trail should indicate 
the host identity and that f the next (host) as 
well as its (agent) intended destination. 
Concordia, Aglets and JADE check if the 
previous host is a trusted one, whereas 
Ajanta poorly supports this (Karnik 
andTripathi, 1998). 
Criterion 4: With encrypted functions, the 
host must have full control over the mobile 
code by encrypting it using some agreed 
conversation algorithms. Ajanta and 
Telescript fully support this, whereas 
Concordia provides adequate support.  
Criterion 5: To avoid tampering and ensure 
that a code reaches its destination, a Fault 
Tolerance Mechanism is used. This 
mechanism when in place helps to achieve 
replication and voting. Voyager, Tacoma 
and Concordia fully support this feature, 
whereas JADE (Andrei, 2002) provides 
adequate support. If an exception is 
encountered that it cannot be handled, the 
system’s server can take appropriate actions 
to assist that specific application to recover. 
Moreover, it should be able to determine the 
cause of the crash. For this reason, Ajanta 
supports itinerary abstraction.  
Criterion 6: Fully supported by Ajanta and 
adequately supported by Agent Tcl, 
Concordia and JADE. JADE achieves this 
on its runtime environment by enforcing the 
use of authentication and access lists when 
joining a transaction. On the other hand, 
Agent Tcl uses safe Tcl in enforcing access 
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restriction based on its authenticated 
identity.     
The results of the evaluation were analysed 
graphically and tabulated. Although more 
than one platforms demonstrated adequate 
support for most of the evaluation criteria, 
our analysis of the evaluation demonstrated 
that JADE offers the best support for 
security amongst all the platforms, followed 
closely by Aglets and Agent Tcl 
(Melomey,2005). Figure 3 illustrates a 
comparison of different platforms against 
the full set of forty-one criteria 
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Figure 3. The comparison 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Security threats to mobile agents have been 
explored in this paper. A list of evaluation 
criteria were illustrated together with an 
evaluation of 8 main mobile agent platforms 
against those criteria. The presented set of 
criteria was derived by considering general 
security requirement of networked systems 
as well as special implications of mobile 
agent systems. The chosen platforms went 
through the evaluation process and the 
values assigned were justified on the basis 
of their ability to meet the requirement in 
the following order; not supported, poorly 
supported, adequately supported and fully 
supported.  
Our work is not complete. Future work 
involves expanding our evaluation criteria to 
include more specialised criteria, and the 
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development of more experiments in order 
to validate from an implementation point of 
view our results.  
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